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Homestead Legislation in Californiat
Charles W. Adams*
The legislature is required by the California Constitution to provide
legislation to protect a portion of the homestead of all heads of families from
forced sale.1 When homestead legislation was first enacted in California in
1851,2 it was the subject of great controversy. 3 Another controversy exists
today as the California Legislature has recently attempted to extend the
protection of homestead legislation to larger numbers of families.4 This
article will survey the laws in California that presently provide homestead
protection and will make proposals for further reform.
The purpose of homestead legislation was stated recently in Swearingen
v. Byrne5 as follows: "The broad purpose of the homestead law is to
promote the security of the home, and to place such property beyond the
reach of the consequences of the home owner's economic misfortune.' '6 In
t This article was prepared by the author for the California Law Revision Commission
and is published here with the Commission's consent. The article was prepared to provide the
Commission with background information to assist the Commission in its study of this subject.
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations contained in this article, however, are entire-
ly those of the author and do not necessarily represent or reflect the opinions, conclusions, or
recommendations of the California Law Revision Commission.
* B.A., 1968 University of California at Santa Barbara; M.A., 1970 University of
California at Santa Barbara; M.B.A., 1972 University of California at Berkeley; J.D., 1976
Boalt Hall, University of California at Berkeley. Associate with the law firm of Cohen and
Ziskin, Beverly Hills, California. Article prepared as a consultant to California Law Revision
Commission.
1. CAL. CONST. art. XX, §1.5.
2. See CAL. STATS. 1851, c. 31, §§l-lI, at 296-98.
3. See Taylor v. Madigan, 53 Cal. App. 3d 943, 955-61, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376,384-88 (1975).
This case contains an excellent discussion of the history of the homestead law.
4. Cf. CAL. STATS. 1977, c. 305, §§1-10, at-; CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1000, §§1-4, at 2368-
73; CAL. STATS. 1974, c. 1251, §§1-6, at 2704-11.
5. 67 Cal. App. 3d 580, 136 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1977).
6. 67 Cal. App. 3d at 584, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 738, quoting Schoenfeld v. Norberg, 267 Cal.
App. 2d 496, 498, 72 Cal. Rptr. 924, 926 (1968).
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addition to protecting the homestead from the claims of creditors, the
declared homestead law also protects the family by restricting the convey-
ance of the homestead by one spouse without the consent of the other7 and
by providing for the descent of the homestead to the surviving spouse after
the death of one of the spouses. 8
Three distinct statutory schemes presently provide homestead protection. 9
The law of declared homesteads is found at Sections 1237 to 1304 in the
Civil Code. Sections 660 through 668 of the Probate Code provide for the
disposition of the homestead on the death of its owner and the designation of
a probate homestead from a decedent's estate if no declared homestead
exists. Recently the California Legislature enacted Code of Civil Procedure
Section 690.31, which requires a creditor to give notice to a debtor of the
debtor's right to claim an exemption from execution at a hearing before the
creditor can obtain a writ of execution against a dwelling house. Because
these laws were not written together, significant differences exist between
them. It would be desirable to eliminate these differences so that homestead
protection would be provided by a single consistent statutory system. 10
THE DECLARED HOMESTEAD
A. Selection of the Declared Homestead
Civil Code Section 1237 provides that a homestead consists of the
dwelling house11 in which the homestead claimant resides plus the outbuild-
7. CAL. CIv. CODE §1242.
8. See CAL. CIv. CODE §1265.
9. For an excellent survey of homestead legislation in the United States, see S. RiESEN-
FELD, CREDrroRS' REMEDIES AND DEBTORS' PROTECTION 302-22 (2d ed. 1975); Haskins, Home-
stead Exemptions, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1289 (1950).
Useful references on California's declared homestead law include: 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Enforcement of Judgment §§29-49 (2d ed. 1971); 25 CAL. JUR. 2d Homesteads §§ I-
50 (1955); Comment, Creation of the Homestead and Its Requirements, 26 CALIF. L. REV. 241
(1938); Comment, The Nature of the Homestead Right and its Termination, 26 CALIF. L. REV.
466 (1938).
See Healey, Disposition of the Homestead Upon Divorce orDeath, 29 L.A.B. BULL. 131, 169
(1954), for a good discussion of the disposition of the declared homestead and the designation of
a probate homestead. See also Comment, The Probate Homestead in California, 53 CALIF. L.
REV. 655 (1965).
10. The need for such a consistent statutory system was noted recently in Krause v.
Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 3d 499, 144 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1978). The Krause court said:
Undoubtedly many persuasive arguments could be presented that a single procedure
applicable to both the homestead exemption and the dwelling house exemption would
be desirable and that the procedures prescribed by sections 674(c) and 690.31 afford
debtors more protection than the procedures prescribed by Civil Code sections 1245
through 1259. (But cf., Civ. Code §§1253, 1255). We are cognizant, too, that the
enactment of sections 674(c) and 690.31 and their interrelation with Civil Code
sections 1245 through 1259 give rise to a number of troublesome questions most of
which are not resolved by today's decision. (See Miller & Starr, Current Law of
California Real Estate, vol. 3 (Rev. ed. 1977) §16:50, pp. 89-98.) These matters,
however, bear not so much on our determination of the question before us as the
urgent need for further consideration and action by the Legislature.
78 Cal. App. 3d at 508, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
11. Although property must be used as the declarant's home to qualify as a homestead,
some use of the property for other purposes is permitted. Bodden v. Community Nat'l Bank,
271 Cal. App. 2d 432, 435, 76 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280 (1969) (homestead consisted of two houses on
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ings and the land on which they are situated. A homestead must be claimed
by the filing of a declaration of homestead in the office of the recorder of the
county where the homestead is located.' 2 A homestead may be selected from
any freehold title, interest, or estate that vests the immediate right of
possession in the homestead declarant or the declarant's spouse, 13 even if
the right of possession is not exclusive.' 4 The amount of the homestead
exemption is $30,000 over and above all liens and encumbrances if the
homestead is selected by a head of a family or a person 65 years of age or
older, and $15,000 for other persons.15
Since a homestead is subject to judgment liens that were recorded in the
county where the property is located before the declaration of homestead
was filed, a homestead is not exempt until a declaration of homestead is
recorded. 16 The requirement that a property owner file a declaration of
homestead before the owner can receive the protection of the homestead law
was not found in the first homestead law enacted in 1851.17 The California
Supreme Court noted this omission in Cook v. McChristian18 and the
homestead law was amended in 1860 to require that a declaration of
homestead be recorded before the recordation of an abstract of judgment in
order for the homestead to be protected from the judgment lien. 19
The recording requirement has been criticized because it denies home-
stead protection to those debtors who do not record declarations of home-
stead because they are unaware of the homestead law 20 The constitutionali-
ty of the recording requirement was unsuccessfully challenged recently in
Taylor v. Madigan,l and the California Legislature has enacted a dwelling
house exemption law to provide many of the benefits of homestead protec-
tion to debtors who fail to record declarations of homestead in time. 22 The
major benefit of the recording requirement is that it facilitates chain of title
searches. Without it a title searcher could not determine whether a judgment
lien attached to real property unless the title searcher went beyond the public
one lot; the declarant lived in one and rented the other); Phelps v. Loop, 64 Cal. App. 2d 332,
333-34, 148 P.2d 674, 675-76 (1944) (18-unit apartment building was a homestead where declar-
ant lived in one unit).
12. CAL. CIV. CODE §§1262-1264.
13. If the spouses are legally separated, they may each claim a married person's separate
homestead. CAL. CIV. CODE §§1300-1304.
14. Property in which a claimant holds an equitable interest may be selected as a home-
stead. Alexander v. Johnson, 92 Cal. 514, 519, 28 P. 593, 594 (1891). Property held in joint
tenancy or tenancy in common may also be selected as a homestead. Estate of Kachigan, 20
Cal. 2d 787, 790-91, 128 P.2d 865, 867 (1942); Bradley v. Scully, 255 Cal. App. 2d 101, 105, 62
Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1967).
15. CAL. CIV. CODE §1260.
16. CAL. CIV. CODE §1241(1).
17. See Taylor v. Madigan, 53 Cal. App. 3d 943, 954-56, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376, 383-84 (1975);
CAL. STATS. 1851, c. 31, §§I-I1, at 296-98.
18. 4 Cal. 24, 27 (1854).
19. See CAL. STATS. 1860, c. 320, §1, at 311.
20. See Rifkind, Archaic Exemption Laws, 39 CAL. ST. B.J. 370, 371 (1964).
21. 53 Cal. App. 3d 943, 961, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376, 387-88 (1975).
22. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §690.31.
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records to find out if the real property constituted a homestead at the time the
abstract of judgment was recorded.
Thus, the recording requirement is necessary if the homestead law is
going to protect homesteads from judgment liens and title to homesteads is
to be determinable from county records; on the other hand, the present effect
of the recording requirement is to deny the protection of the homestead laws
to those who are not aware of them. This conflict could be resolved in a
number of ways. The simplest solution would be to amend the homestead
law so that it would allow a debtor to claim a homestead after an abstract of
judgment is recorded, but before the execution sale, by recording a declara-
tion of homestead. The claim of homestead would then dissolve any pre-
existing judgment liens to the extent of the exemption.2 3 Any writ of
execution levied against a dwelling house would be required to be accom-
panied by a notice (in both English and Spanish) to the debtor of the right to
claim the homestead under this scheme. 24 The debtor could record a declara-
tion of homestead and discharge pre-existing judgment liens as long as the
debtor resided on the property; however, if the debtor transferred the
property before claiming the homestead, any pre-existing judgment liens
could be enforced against the transferee. 25
Alternatively, the homestead law could be changed so that the homestead
was exempt from execution, but not from judgment liens that would attach
to the homestead and would be satisfied whenever the property was transfer-
red by the debtor. 26 This would seriously impair the protection afforded by
homestead laws and would produce hardships for debtors who change
residences frequently. Civil Code Sections 1257 and 1265a of the present
homestead law protect the proceeds of a sale of a homestead from execution
for six months after the sale. In addition, under Section 1265a a debtor may
select another homestead within six months after a sale of an earlier home-
stead and the later homestead is treated as dating from the time of
recordation of the earlier homestead. These provisions reflect the sound
legislative policy of permitting a debtor to change residences in our highly
mobile society without losing the protection of the homestead laws. It would
be contrary to this policy to allow a judgment lien to attach to the home-
23. The claiming of a homestead after execution is permitted in a number of states. E.g.,
OR. REV. STAT. §23.270 (1975); UTAH CODE ANN. §28-1-10 (1953); Wis. STAT. ANN. §815.21
(West 1977). See also text accompanying notes 153-155 infra.
24. The notice required should be similar to that provided for in Section 690.31 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure.
25. Oregon and Wisconsin have procedures for a homestead claimant to discharge judg-
ment liens on the homestead if its value is less than the exempt amount. See OR. REV. STAT.
§23.280 (1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. §815.20(2) (West 1977). By following these procedures, a
homestead claimant can insure that a judgment lienholder cannot levy on the homestead in the
future when its value may rise above the homestead exemption.
26. This is analogous to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 674(c) which now
provides that a dwelling house that is exempt from execution under California Code of Civil
Procedure Section 690.31 is nevertheless subject to judgment liens.
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stead, even if the homestead were exempt from execution as long as the
debtor owned it.
A third alternative would be to provide that a claim of a homeowner's or
veteran's property tax exemption27 would also effect a selection of a home-
stead. 28 The claims of homeowner's or veteran's exemptions are public
records and are therefore easily accessible to a title searcher. The standards
for entitlement to a homeowner's or veteran's exemption are similar to those
of a homestead; both require the claimant to reside on the claimed prop-
erty.
29
A variation of this proposal would be to provide a place where a home-
stead could be claimed on the forms for claiming a homeowner's or veter-
an's property tax exemption. In addition, information about the homestead
laws could be supplied (in both English and Spanish) with the homeowner's
or veteran's exemption forms. The criticism that present homestead laws
afford protection only to those who are aware of the protection they offer
would be greatly mollified if a larger number of homeowners were informed
of the homestead laws and could conveniently select a homestead.
B. Execution or Forced Sale of a Homestead
A homestead is subject to execution or forced sale on account of mechan-
ics' and other similar types of liens, consensual liens, and judgment liens
recorded prior to the declaration of homestead.3" In addition, Civil Code
Sections 1245 to 1259 provide a procedure31 for a creditor to execute on or
attach32 a homestead if the value of the homestead, over and above all liens
27. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE §§205.5, 218.
28. A possible advantage of giving homeowners an automatic homestead exemption when
they claim a homeowner's exemption is that the claim of a homestead exemption would not
affect their ability to obtain loans. Some lenders require borrowers to state whether they have
claimed a homestead on their loan forms.
29. One distinction between entitlement to a homestead and a homeowner's exemption is
that a homestead remains valid until abandoned, while a homeowner's exemption is valid only
so long as the homeowner continues to occupy the home as his principle place of residence.
These and other differences, however, could be removed by modifying either the homestead or
homeowner's exemption laws. On the other hand, it may be undesirable to force the homestead
and homeowner's exemption laws into the same mold, because they were enacted for different
purposes.
30. CAL. CIV. CODE §1241.
31. The procedure provided for in California Civil Code Sections 1245 through 1259 is as
follows: The creditor first levies a writ of execution on the homestead in order to create a lien
on the excess over the homestead exemption. Within 60 days after levy of execution, the
creditor must file an application with the court clerk for the appointment of appraisers of the
homestead. If the creditor does not make such an application within the 60-day period, his
execution lien ceases and he cannot enforce his judgment by levy of another execution on the
homestead. Within 90 days of the filing of the application, the creditor must give the debtor
notice of a hearing for the appointment of three appraisers. Next, within 15 days after their
appointment the appraisers are required to report to the court as to the value of the homestead,
the amount of liens and encumbrances, and whether it can be divided without material injury. If
the value of the homestead, over and above all liens and encumbrances, exceeds the homestead
exemption and the homestead cannot be divided without material injury, the court must order
an execution sale. The proceeds from the sale are then distributed in accordance with California
Civil Code Section 1256.
32. Southern Pac. Milling Co. v. Milligan, 15 Cal. 2d 729, 730-31, 104 P.2d 654, 654-55
(1940); Marelli v. Keating, 208 Cal. 528, 530, 282 P. 793, 793-94 (1929).
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and encumbrances, exceeds the amount of the homestead exemption. 33
Although a creditor may utilize the procedure in Civil Code Sections 1245
to 1259 to obtain an execution or attachment lien on the excess over the
homestead exemption, a judgment lien does not attach to the excess because
property subject to a prior homestead declaration is totally exempt from
judgment liens. 34 The rule that a judgment lien does not attach to the excess
over the homestead exemption should be changed, because it permits other
creditors to gain priority with respect to the excess value over a judgment
creditor who does not promptly obtain an execution lien. The present law
thus encourages judgment creditors to execute as soon as possible so that the
debtor cannot convey or encumber the homestead in order to prevent the
judgment creditor from reaching the excess value. The homestead should be
exempt from judgment liens only to the extent of the homestead exemption.
The present homestead law treats a homestead held by a husband and wife
as joint tenants quite differently from a community property homestead. In
Schoenfeld v. Norberg,35 the court held that in order for a joint tenancy
homestead to be sold at an execution sale, the value of the debtor's share in
the property must exceed the sum of the homestead exemption and the total
of the joint encumbrances on the property. 36 On the other hand, a communi-
ty property homestead may be sold if the total value of the property-not
merely the debtor's share of the property-exceeds the sum of the home-
stead exemption and the encumbrances on the property. 37 The Schoenfeld
court recognized that its holding placed severe limitations on the situations
in which a creditor could reach the excess over the homestead exemption
when a homestead is held in joint tenancy. It noted that if a debtor held a
one-half interest in a homestead, a sale could not be ordered if a joint
encumbrance exceeded one-half the value of the property. 3 Nevertheless,
the court decided that it was compelled to reach its conclusion by the
language of the statute. 39 This language should be changed so that a
judgment creditor could execute on a homestead if its total value exceeded
the sum of the homestead exemption and the encumbrances, whether the
homestead was held in joint tenancy or as community property.
33. California Civil Code Sections 1245 through 1259 were not impliedly repealed by the
enactment of Code of Civil Procedure Section 690.31 and the procedure found in Civil Code
Sections 1245 through 1259 is still applicable to execution on declared homesteads. Krause v.
Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 3d 499, 144 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1978).
34. E.g., Boggs v. Dunn, 160 Cal. 283, 285-87, 116 P. 743, 744-45 (1911); Swearingen v.
Byrne, 67 Cal. App. 3d 580, 585, 136 Cal. Rptr. 736, 739 (1977).
35. 11 Cal. App. 3d 755, 90 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1970).
36. Id. at 764-65, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
37. See id. at 760, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
38. Id. at 766, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 54.
39. Id. at 764-65, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 53.
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Civil Code Section 1256 provides for the allocation of the proceeds from
an execution sale of a homestead in the following order of priority: first, to
the discharge of all liens and encumbrances; second, the amount of the
homestead exemption is distributed to the homestead claimant; third, to the
satisfaction of the execution; and fourth, the balance is distributed to the
homestead claimant. A too literal interpretation of this section would permit
creditors holding liens or encumbrances that are subsequent to the judgment
creditor's execution lien to obtain priority over the judgment creditor. n0
Fortunately, the courts that have dealt with this problem have given the
judgment creditor's execution lien priority over subsequent liens, encum-
brances and conveyances. 41 The erroneous statutory language, however,
should be corrected.
C. The Homestead Exemption in Bankruptcy
One of the most important aspects of the homestead law is the application
of the homestead exemption in bankruptcy. Sections 6 and 70a of the
Bankruptcy Act42 provide bankrupts with those exemptions that are pre-
scribed by federal or state law. 43 In order to claim the homestead exemption
in a bankruptcy proceeding a debtor must have established a right to the
exemption prior to the date of bankruptcy. 44 Since a debtor in California
must record a declaration of homestead before the debtor is entitled to a
homestead exemption,45 the debtor may not claim a homestead exemption in
bankruptcy unless the debtor has recorded a declaration of homestead prior
to the date of bankruptcy. 46 In addition to satisfying the state law require-
ments for entitlement to a homestead exemption, the debtor must also
comply with the federal bankruptcy law procedure for claiming an exemp-
tion by stating a claim to the homestead exemption in the schedule of
property that is filed in the bankruptcy proceeding. 47
A homestead will be exempt in bankruptcy even if it was acquired and the
declaration of homestead was recorded on the eve of bankruptcy, so long as
40. CAL. CIV. CODE §1256.
41. Marelli v. Keating, 208 Cal. 528, 530, 282 P. 793, 794 (1929) (dictum); Lean v. Giveis,
146 Cal. 739, 743, 81 P. 128, 129 (1905).
42. 11 U.S.C. §§ 24, 110(a) (1976).
43. A new Bankruptcy Law was pending before Congress at time of publication. Both the
House of Representatives version of the law, H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and the
Senate version, S. 2266, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), provide for exemptions for property that
is exempt under federal, state or local law. The new Bankruptcy Law would also provide an
alternative exemption for a debtor's interest, not to exceed $10,000 in value, in real property
that the debtor or his family used as a residence. Since this is less than the amount of the
homestead exemption in California, the new Bankruptcy Law would have no effect on the
amount of the homestead exemption that could be claimed in a bankruptcy proceeding in
California.
44. White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310 (1924); IA J. MOORE, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY Exemp-
tion of Bankrupts 6.07, at 825-26 (14th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as J. MOORE].
45. See CAL. CIV. CODE §1265.
46. White v. Stump, 266 U.S. 310 (1924); J. MOORE, supra note 44, 6.07, at 825-26.
47. BANKR. RULE 403; J. MOORE, supra note 44, 6.19[l], at 903-05.
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this was done without fraudulent intent.48 Also since a homestead is exempt
from the claims of creditors, a transfer of a homestead cannot be set aside as
a fraudulent conveyance 49 or a voidable preference. 50
D. Protection of the Debtor's Spouse
The homestead laws are intended not only for the protection of a debtor
from creditors, but also for the protection of the debtor's spouse and
family. 51 Thus, the homestead may be selected by the debtor's spouse, as
well as the debtor, even if their residence is the debtor's separate property.52
Moreover, a married person generally cannot convey or encumber the
homestead without the spouse's consent 53 and on the death of one of the
spouses, the property vests in the survivor. 54 The restriction on conveyan-
cing and the survivorship features of the homestead laws are significant
where the homestead is the separate property of one spouse. These features
may be removed by abandonment of the homestead 5 or by the conveyance
of one spouse's interest in the homestead to the other.
56
On dissolution of a marriage the community and quasi-community prop-
erty of the spouses, including the homestead, is divided equally between
them.5 7 A court in a dissolution proceeding has the power to order the
homestead sold so that it can be divided between the spouses despite the fact
that Civil Code Sections 1240 and 1241 do not provide for such a sale. 58 The
marital dissolution does not cause the homestead to be abandoned and the
homestead remains exempt from creditors after the dissolution.5 9 After a
legal separation or an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of a marriage,
48. See In re Jackson, 472 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir. 1973); Wurdick v. Clements, 451 F.2d
988, 989 (9th Cir. 1971); In re Smith, 366 F. Supp. 1213, 1218 (D. Idaho 1973); J. MOORE, supra
note 44, 611[5], at 857-58.
49. See Montgomery v. Bullock, I I Cal. 2d 58, 62, 77 P.2d 846, 849 (1938); Oppenheim v.
Goodley, 148 Cal. App. 2d 325, 327, 306 P.2d 944, 946 (1957); 11 U.S.C. §107(d) (1976). If a
trustee in bankruptcy, however, recovers property that has been fraudulently conveyed or
concealed, a bankrupt will be barred from claiming that the property is exempt. 11 U.S.C. §24
(1976); J. MOORE, supra note 44, 6.11[4] at 857.
50. Rutledge v. Johansen, 270 F.2d 881,882-83 (10th Cir. 1954); see In re Hausman, 209 F.
Supp. 219, 222 (M.D. Ga. 1962).
51. See Estate of McIntyre, 189 Cal. App. 2d 498, 11 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1961):
The object of homestead legislation is to provide a place for the family and its
surviving members, where they may reside and enjoy the comforts of a home, freed
from any anxiety that it may be taken from them against their will, either by reason of
their own necessity or improvidence, or from the importunity of their creditors.
Id. at 502, 1I Cal. Rptr. at 736, quoting Estate of Fath, 132 Cal. 609, 613, 64 P. 995, 997 (1901).
52. CAL. CIV. CODE §§1238, 1260-1261.
53. CAL. CIv. CODE §1242.
54. CAL. CIv. CODE §1265. The next section of this article contains a detailed discussion of
the disposition of a declared homestead on the death of its owner.
55. See CAL. Civ. CODE §1243.
56. See CAL. CIv. CODE §§1242, 1265.
57. CAL. CIv. CODE §4800.
58. Bonner v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. App. 3d 156, 163-67, 133 Cal. Rptr. 592, 597-99
(1976).
59. Id. at 163, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 596-97.
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each spouse may select a married person's separate homestead from that
spouse's separate property or from the property awarded to that spouse. 6°
The foregoing discussion has focused primarily on the protection that the
homestead law provides from creditors. The next portion of this article will
deal with the elaborate statutory system that provides for the disposition of
the family home, whether or not it is a declared homestead, on the death of
its owner.
DISPOSITION OF THE FAMILY HOME ON DEATH
Special rules for the disposition of the family home upon the death of its
owner are found in Probate Code Sections 660 through 668. Sections 660,
663, 664, 665, 666 and 668 govern the disposition of a homestead that was
declared during the lifetime of its owner and Sections 661, 662 and 667
provide for the setting aside of a probate homestead where no homestead has
been declared during the decedent's lifetime. Significant differences exist
between the treatment of a declared homestead and a probate homestead.
Since there does not appear to be any justification for these differences, it is
recommended that they be removed by appropriate legislation. 61
A. Disposition of the Declared Homestead
After the decedent's death, the surviving spouse and minor children may
remain in possession of the homestead and other exempt property of the
estate until the estate inventory is filed. 62 Thereafter, upon petition of the
surviving spouse, the declared homestead (other than a married person's
separate homestead) 63 will be set apart from the estate and will vest abso-
lutely in the surviving spouse. A declared homestead, however, will be
deemed to be terminated on the date of death of its owner, if: (1) it was
selected by the surviving spouse out of the decedent's separate property and
the decedent did not join in its selection; 64 (2) it was declared during a
previous marriage of the decedent; 65 or (3) the surviving spouse conveyed
the homestead to the decedent without a reservation of homestead rights. 66 If
a declared homestead is deemed to have terminated on the death of the
decedent, it will pass to the decedent's heirs or devisees, subject to the
power of the probate court to set it aside for a limited time for the benefit of
60. CAL. CIV. CODE §§1300-1304.
61. See text accompanying notes 160-164 infra.
62. CAL. PROB. CODE §660.
63. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§1300-1304.
64. See Weinreich v. Hensley, 121 Cal. 647, 653-56, 54P. 254,255-57 (1898) (case decided
under former CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§1465, 1474, which were repealed by CAL. STATS. 1931, c.
281, §1700, at 687); CAL. CiV. CODE §1265; CAL. PROB. CODE §§661, 663.
65. Estate of Ronayne, 104 Cal. App. 2d 53, 56-57, 231 P.2d 105, 107 (1951); Estate of
Clavo, 6 Cal. App. 774, 779-80, 93 P. 295, 296-97 (1907).
66. See CAL. CIV. CODE §1265; CAL. PROB. CODE §663.
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the decedent's family. 67
Title to a declared homestead that does not terminate on the decedent's
death vests absolutely in the surviving spouse without administration of the
estate and the decedent's power of testamentary disposition is subordinate to
the surviving spouse's right to the homestead. 68 The surviving spouse,
however, may elect to take under the decedent's will and may thereby waive
or be estopped from claiming homestead rights.69 The exemption features of
a declared homestead continue in effect after title vests in the surviving
spouse; 70 however, the homestead characteristics that restrict conveyancing
or provide for its descent cease after title vests in the surviving spouse. 71
One of the major differences between the treatment of a declared home-
stead and a probate homestead is that liens and encumbrances on a declared
homestead are exonerated, 72 whereas liens and encumbrances on a probate
homestead are not.73 Probate Code Section 735 provides that claims secured
by liens and encumbrances on the homestead must be paid from the funds of
the estate if such funds are sufficient to pay all claims against the estate. If
the funds are not sufficient, then claims secured by liens and encumbrances
on the homestead are to be paid proportionately with other claims allowed
against the estate. The remaining liens and encumbrances are enforceable
against the homestead, if this is permitted by Civil Code Sections 1241 and
1265, only for any deficiency left after such payments. 74
Probate Code Section 664 places a significant limitation on the value of a
declared homestead that may pass to the surviving spouse. Under Probate
Code Section 664 the homestead will be set apart to the surviving spouse if
the appraised value of the homestead in the inventory of the estate is less
than the amount of the homestead exemption in effect at the date of death of
the decedent. Alternatively, if the homestead had previously been appraised
under Civil Code Sections 1245 through 1259, the homestead will be set
67. Estate of Wright, 98 Cal. App. 633,635,277 P. 372,373 (1929); CAL. CIV. CODE §1265.
See text accompanying notes 76-103 infra.
68. See Bradley v. Scully, 255 Cal. App. 2d 101, 105, 62 Cal. Rptr. 834, 837 (1967); CAL.
CIV. CODE §1265.
69. Estate of Cecala, 104 Cal. App. 2d 526, 532-34, 232 P.2d 48, 52-53 (1951). But see
generally Dixon v. Russell, 9 Cal. 2d 262, 70 P.2d 196 (1937); Selinger v. Milly, 51 Cal. App. 2d
286, 124 P.2d 631 (1942).
70. Estate of Ronayne, 104 Cal. App. 2d 53, 55, 231 P.2d 104, 106 (1951); Estate of Clavo,
6 Cal. App. 774, 779, 93 P. 295, 296 (1907); see CAL. CIv. CODE §1265.
71. See Estate of Ronayne, 104 Cal. App. 2d 53, 56, 231 P.2d 105, 107 (1951); Estate of
Clavo, 6 Cal. App. 774, 779-80, 93 P. 295, 296-97 (1907).
72. See CAL. PROB. CODE §735.
73. See Estate of Huelsman, 127 Cal. 275, 59 P. 776 (1899) (case decided under former
Section 1475 of the Code of Civil Procedure which was repealed by CAL. STATS. 1931, c. 281,
§1700, at 687, when the California Probate Code was adopted); 2 J. GODDARD, CALIFORNIA
PRACTICE, Probate Court Practice §916, at 8 (3d ed. 1977); CONTINUING EDUCATION OFTHE BAR,
CALIFORNIA DECEDENT ESTATE ADMINISTRATION §12.58 (1971) (exempt and homestead proper-
ty). But see Estate of Shively, 145 Cal. 400, 403, 78 P. 869, 870-71 (1904).
74. See CAL. PROB. CODE §735.
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apart to the surviving spouse if its value at that time had been determined to
be less than the homestead exemption at the date of death. Since the liens
and encumbrances on the homestead are exonerated under Section 735, they
are not deducted from the appraised value for the purposes of Section 664. 75
If the homestead is returned in the inventory appraised at more than the
amount of the homestead exemption at the date of death, then the inher-
itance tax referee must appraise the homestead at the time it was selected. If
the value of the homestead at the time it was selected, or, if it was appraised
pursuant to Civil Code Sections 1245 through 1259, its value at the time of
such appraisal, exceeds the homestead exemption at the date of death, then
the homestead must be divided, if this can be done without material injury,
or sold pursuant to Probate Code Section 665, so that the proceeds can be
distributed to the surviving spouse and the estate. It is apparent that these
provisions for the valuation of the homestead are needlessly complex,
arbitrary and in need of reform.
B. Designation of a Probate Homestead
The family home is also protected on the death of its owner from heirs and
creditors of the decedent's estate when the family home is not the subject of
a declared homestead. The protection that the law provides for the surviving
spouse and minor children of the decedent was summarized recently in
Taylor v. Madigan76 as follows:
The objective of the probate homestead statutes is protection of
the family, as a social unit in the home, against demands of
creditors and heirs, against the family's own improvidence ....
There are a number of basic differences which indicate that the
rights created here are considerably different from those created
by the statutory homestead procedures, e.g., the court may put a
time limit on the duration of the homestead. . . . the court is not
limited to the property actually occupied by the family at the time
of decedent's death, but may select it out of any of the estate
property suitable for residence purposes, and it may be used for
other purposes as well, . . . and the value is left to the discretion
of the court with no monetary limit, provided the property is the
bona fide residence of the family. . . . It will thus be seen that
there is a legislative policy of even greater protection for those
who have lost the head of their family and, therefore, are in a
more precarious position than those families in which the head of
the family is still in the home. 77
Probate Code Section 661 provides that if no homestead has been de-
clared during the lifetime of the decedent or if a declared homestead
75. Estate of Herbert, 122 Cal. 329, 331, 54 P. 1109, 1110 (1898) (dictum); see Estate of
Durham, 108 Cal. App. 2d 148, 152, 238 P.2d 1057, 1060 (1951).
76. 53 Cal. App. 3d 943, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1975).
77. Id. at 968, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
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terminated at the date of death, 78 then the probate court must designate a
probate homestead for the use of the surviving spouse and minor children of
the decedent. As with the declared homestead, the decedent's power of
testamentary disposition is subordinate to the right of the surviving spouse
and minor children to a probate homestead. 79 The right to a probate home-
stead is independent of, and in addition to, any other rights or property that
the surviving spouse and minor children may have, and is not conditioned
on their not having other property or any other place to live. 80 The probate
homestead may be lost by waiver,81 estoppe182 or election 83 of the surviving
spouse to take under the will of the decedent. The claim of a surviving
spouse to a probate homestead, however, is strongly favored and the waiver,
estoppel or election must be clearly demonstrated in order to defeat the
surviving spouse's right to a probate homestead.84
The probate court is given broad discretion in selecting the property to be
designated as a probate homestead from the estate.85 Section 661 states that
the probate homestead must be selected from community property, quasi-
community property or real property held by the decedent and the surviving
spouse in common, or, if there is no such property, from the decedent's
separate property. Nevertheless, the court in Estate of Raymond86 upheld
the probate court's designation of a probate homestead from the decedent's
separate property, even though the estate contained residential property
owned by the decedent and his widow as tenants in common, because the
separate property was a more suitable home for the widow.8 7 The property
designated as a probate homestead must be useable as a residence, but some
78. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra, for the circumstances when a declared
homestead terminates on the death of its owner.
79. Estate of Schmelz, 259 Cal. App. 2d 440, 443, 66 Cal. Rptr. 480, 483 (1968); Estate of
Dell, 196 Cal. App. 2d 809, 812, 17 Cal. Rptr. 46,48 (1961); Estate of Davis, 86 Cal. App. 2d 263,
264-65, 194 P.2d 713, 714 (1948).
80. Estate of Firth, 145 Cal. 236, 238, 78 P. 643, 644 (1904); Estate of Nelson, 224 Cal.
App. 2d 138, 145, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356 (1964); Estate of Ronayne, 104 Cal. App. 2d 53, 58, 231
P.2d 105, 108 (1951).
81. Estate of Hawkins, 141 Cal. App. 2d 391, 397-98, 296 P.2d 873, 877 (1956); Estate of
Howe, 81 Cal. App. 2d 95, 99, 183 P.2d 329, 331 (1947); Estate of Wyss, 112 Cal. App. 487,497-
98, 297 P. 100 (1931).
82. Estate of Hawkins, 141 Cal. App. 2d.391, 397-98, 296 P.2d 873, 877 (1956); Estate of
Howe, 81 Cal. App. 2d 95, 99, 183 P.2d 329, 331 (1947); Estate of Wyss, 112 Cal. App. 487,497-
98, 297 P. 100, 104 (1931).
83. Estate of Wyss, 112 Cal. App. 487, 495-97, 297 P. 100 (1931).
84. Estate of Schmelz, 259 Cal. App. 2d 440, 447, 66 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485 (1968); Estate of
Alba, 238 Cal. App. 2d 618, 622-23, 48 Cal. Rptr. 100, 103 (1965); Estate of Claussenius, 96 Cal.
App. 2d 600, 613, 216 P.2d 485, 494 (1950). Since the probate homestead is intended for the
benefit of the family unit, when minor children are involved, a waiver by the widow will defeat
neither the children's nor the widow's right to a probate homestead. Estate of Branam, 66 Cal.
App. 2d 309, 316-17, 152 P.2d 354, 358-59 (1944).
85. Estate of Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 144, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 (1964); Estate of
Raymond, 137 Cal. App. 2d 134, 136, 289 P.2d 890, 891 (1955). The probate court has the
discretion to designate as a probate homestead property other than that selected by the
surviving spouse. Estate of Mattingly, 19 Cal. App. 2d 550, 551-52, 65 P.2d 1338, 1338-39 (1937).
86. 137 Cal. App. 2d 134, 289 P.2d 890 (1955).
87. Id. at 136-37, 289 P.2d at 892.
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commercial use is permitted." 8
In selecting a probate homestead a court will consider the rights of
creditors, the financial status of the estate and the value of the probate
homestead.8 9 Probate Code Section 661 places no limit on the value of the
probate homestead to be selected and a court should select a probate
homestead for the surviving family of as great a value as possible con-
sidering the amount and condition of the estate. 90
Unlike the declared homestead, title to which vests in the surviving
spouse on the death of the decedent, the probate homestead is set apart for
the use of the surviving spouse and minor children. Probate Code Section
667 provides that one-half of the probate homestead becomes the property of
the surviving spouse and the other half goes to the decedent's minor
children 9' in equal shares. The probate homestead will be lost if the surviv-
ing spouse remarries or dies, 92 or if a minor child reaches majority, 93 before
the time of the order setting apart the probate homestead. In order to receive
a probate homestead, the surviving spouse must have been married to the
decedent at the date of death; if the decedent and surviving spouse were
separated, then the probate homestead will be set apart to the surviving
spouse out of the decedent's estate only if the surviving spouse was entitled
to support from the decedent.94
If the probate homestead is selected from property other than separate
property of the decedent, it may be assigned to the surviving spouse and
minor children for an indefinite period, including an estate in fee simple.95 If
the probate homestead, however, is selected from the separate property of
the decedent, it can be set apart for only a limited period, the duration of
which is subject to the discretion of the probate court,96 provided that it does
not exceed the lifetime of the surviving spouse or the minority of the
children. 97 A probate homestead selected from the separate property of the
88. Compare Estate of Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 145, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352, 356 (1964)
(30-unit apartment building designated as probate homestead) with In re Noah, 73 Cal. 590, 593,
15 P. 290, 292 (1887) (four-story office building could not be designated as probate homestead).
89. Estate of Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 144, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 (1964); Estate of
Claussenius, 96 Cal. App. 2d 600, 611, 216 P.2d 485, 493 (1950).
90. Estate of Nelson, 224 Cal. App. 2d 138, 144, 36 Cal. Rptr. 352, 355 (1964); Estate of
Raymond, 137 Cal. App. 2d 134, 136,289 P.2d 890,891 (1955). The probate homestead can even
absorb the entire estate. Estate of Alba, 238 Cal. App. 2d 618,621, 48 Cal. Rptr. 100, 102 (1965).
91. Minor children of a previous marriage are not eligible for a probate homestead. Estate
of Rosenaur, 107 Cal. App. 2d 461, 462, 237 P.2d 17, 18 (1951).
92. In re Still, 117 Cal. 409, 514, 49 P. 463,465 (1897) (remarries). See Estate of Blair, 42
Cal. 2d 728, 731-33, 269 P.2d 612, 614-15 (1954) (dies).
93. Estate of Heywood, 149 Cal. 129, 130-31, 84 P. 834, 839 (1906).
94. Estate of Brooks, 28 Cal. 2d 748, 171 P.2d 724 (1946).
95. See Estate of Rogoff, 205 Cal. App. 2d 650, 654, 23 Cal. Rptr. 334, 336 (1962); Estate
of Cesare, 130 Cal. App. 2d 557, 569, 279 P.2d 607, 614 (1955).
96. Estate of Moskowitz, 247 Cal. App. 2d 499, 502, 55 Cal. Rptr. 572, 573-74 (1966);
Estate of Somers, 84 Cal. App. 2d 726, 727-28, 191 P.2d 776, 777 (1948); Estate of Rosland, 76
Cal. App. 2d 709, 712, 173 P.2d 830, 832 (1946); CAL. PROB. CODE §661.
97. Estate of Bonner, 222 Cal. App. 2d 426, 428, 35 Cal. Rptr. 264,265 (1963); CAL. PROB.
CODE §661. A decedent's undivided interest in property held by the decedent and the surviving
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decedent for a limited period remains subject to administration by the
probate court and passes to the heirs or devisees of the decedent at the end of
this period. 98
Since the probate homestead is set apart for the benefit of the surviving
spouse and the minor children, the power of these parties to convey or
encumber the probate homestead is limited. In Hoppe v. Fountain,9 the
court held that while a widow could convey or encumber her interest in the
probate homestead, a purchaser of her interest could not deprive her children
of the right to occupy the probate homestead during their minority by
obtaining a partition of the probate homestead. 10 Similarly, the conveyance
by an adult child of his or her interest in the probate homestead cannot
operate to prejudice the right of the surviving spouse to occupancy of the
probate homestead. 101
The requirement of Probate Code Section 735 that liens and encum-
brances on the homestead be exonerated does not appear to be applicable to
probate homesteads. 0 2 The probate homestead, however, is exempt from
claims of unsecured creditors of the estate and the surviving spouse to the
same extent as a declared homestead. 103
Until July 1, 1975, the homestead legislation in California consisted of
the declared homestead and probate homestead laws. The legislature in-
troduced a third system of homestead protection in 1975 by providing for the
exemption from execution of dwelling houses for which no declaration of
homestead had been recorded. This new dwelling house exemption is the
topic of the next section of this article.
spouse as tenants in common was held to be the separate property of the decedent and could be
assigned to the surviving spouse for only a limited period. Estate of Adams, 228 Cal. App. 2d
264, 266, 39 Cal. Rptr. 522, 524 (1964); Estate of Maxwell, 7 Cal. App. 2d 641, 46 P.2d 777
(1935).
98. CAL. PROB. CODE §§661, 663.
99. 104 Cal. 94, 37 P. 894 (1894).
100. Id. at 101, 37 P. at 895; accord, Hodge v. Norton, 133 Cal. 99, 65 P. 123 (1901). The
children may, however, convey or encumber their interests upon attaining majority, and during
their minority, their guardian may sell their interests under court supervision. Estate of
Hamilton, 120 Cal. 421,428-29, 52 P. 708, 710-11 (1898).
101. Moore v. Hoffman, 125 Cal. 90, 92-93, 57 P. 769, 770 (1899).
102. Estate of Huelsman, 127 Cal. 275, 277, 59 P. 776, 776 (1899). This case was decided
under former Section 1475 of the Code of Civil Procedure, repealed CAL. STATS. 1931 , c. 281, at
587, which was expressly limited to homesteads selected and recorded prior to the death of the
decedent. Although Probate Code Section 735 does not contain this limitation, Huelsman is still
cited by commentators for the proposition that liens and encumbrances on probate homesteads
are not exonerated. See, e.g., I CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA DECEDENT
ESTATE ADMINISTRATION §12.58 (1971); Comment, The Probate Homestead in California, 53
CALIF. L. REV. 655, 671, 679 (1965).
103. Keyes v. Cyrus, 100 Cal. 322, 34 P. 722 (1893). In Keyes, the court stated:
Section 1240 of the Civil Code, which declares that "the homestead is exempt from
execution or forced sale, except as in this title provided," is not in terms limited to the
homestead selected by the parties, and .. the provisions of this section must be held
to apply to every homestead, whether selected and recorded by the voluntary act of
the parties or by an order of the superior court.
Id. at 327, 34 P. at 724.
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THE DWELLING HOUSE EXEMPTION
A. Introduction
Code of Civil Procedure Section 690.235 was enacted in 1975. The
apparent legislative intent was to provide many of the benefits of the
declared homestead law to those debtors who are unaware of the declared
homestead law and who therefore may fail to take advantage of it by record-
ing a declaration of homestead before a creditor records an abstract of
judgment in the county where the debtor's principal residence is located. 104
Code of Civil Procedure Section 690.235 was replaced by Section 690.31
on July 1, 1977.105 Section 690.31 was evidently intended to clarify a
number of ambiguities and legal problems found in Section 690.235; yet
many of these ambiguities and legal problems persist in Section 690.31.
Section 690.31 imposes a burden on creditors by requiring a notice and
hearing to determine the availability of the dwelling house exemption before
a creditor can enforce a judgment against a dwelling house. At the same
time, as will be discussed in this section, it does not fulfill its legislative
purpose of giving large numbers of debtors the full protection of the
declared homestead law. It is recommended, therefore, that attorneys
continue to record declarations of homestead for their clients rather than rely
on the automatic protection of the claimed dwelling house exemption of
Section 690.31.
B. Nature and Extent of the Claimed Dwelling House Exemption
Section 690.3 1(a) incorporates much of the declared homestead law into
the dwelling house exemption by defining the extent and amount of the
dwelling house exemption by reference to the declared homestead law. The
dwelling house exemption, therefore, extends to the same types of property
and ownership interests that are protected by the declared homestead law. In
addition, the dwelling house exemption is limited to the amount of the
declared homestead exemption. 106
While Section 690.31(a) appears to carry over much of the declared
homestead law, substantial differences exist between the claimed dwelling
house exemption and the declared homestead law. The most significant
difference is that a judgment lien can attach to a dwelling house whereas a
judgment lien cannot attach to a declared homestead. When Section 690.31
was adopted, Section 674 was amended'07 by the addition of subsection (c)
which provides that, notwithstanding the exemption provided by Section
104. For a discusison of former Section 690.235 of the California Code of Civil Procedure
see Adams, California's New Homestead Law, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 180 (1976).
105. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1000, §§3, 4, at 2369.
106. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
107. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1000, §1, at 2368.
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690.31, a judgment lien attaches to a dwelling house, other than a declared
homestead, when an abstract of judgment against an owner of the dwelling
house is recorded in the county where the dwelling house is located.
Section 674(c) is of substantial benefit to judgment creditors because it
enables them to obtain priority over subsequent lienholders with respect to
the dwelling house without having to execute on it. It also benefits the title
insurance industry because it eliminates the need of a title searcher to
determine whether the debtor is eligible for the dwelling house exemption in
order to determine title to the property. Whether or not the debtor is eligible
for the dwelling house exemption, a creditor's judgment lien will attach to
the debtor's dwelling house, and constitute a cloud on the debtor's title,
unless the dwelling house is a declared homestead.
On the other hand, Section 674(c) is a serious detriment to the debtor's
protection because under Sections 690.31 and 674(c) the dwelling house is
exempt from execution for only so long as it is owned by the debtor. If the
debtor should find it necessary to sell the dwelling house, the creditor could
enforce a judgment: (1) against the dwelling house in the hands of the new
owner; (2) out of the proceeds of the sale; or (3) against the debtor's new
dwelling house, if the new dwelling house happens to be in a county where
the abstract of judgment was recorded. 1 8 Section 674(c) seriously under-
mines the protection afforded by the dwelling house exemption in our highly
mobile society in which persons change residences rather frequently. As
noted earlier, 1°9 the declared homestead law provides that a debtor may
change residences without losing the protection of the homestead law. Such
a provision is an essential part of the protection afforded by the homestead
law and the absence of such a provision from the claimed dwelling house
exemption is unfortunate.
Since a dwelling house is exempt "to the same extent" as a declared
homestead and no special rule is provided for property held in joint tenancy,
the rule from Schoenfeld v. Norberg l0 is applicable to the dwelling house
exemption as well as to declared homesteads. As noted earlier, the Schoen-
feld rule11' should be abolished by an amendment that would permit a
creditor to execute on joint-tenancy property if its total value exceeded the
amount of the exemption and the total of the encumbrances. 112
The claimed dwelling house exemption found in Section 690.31 incorpo-
rates only the exemption features of the declared homestead law. Therefore,
persons who desire to obtain other homestead characteristics such as those
108. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §674(c).
109. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
110. 11 Cal. App. 3d 755, 90 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1970).
111. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
112. See text accompanying notes 156-157 infra for a proposal for abolishing the Schoen-feld rule.
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pertaining to descent 13 or restriction on conveyancing114 of the homestead
must record a declaration of homestead to do so.
C. Exceptions to the Dwelling House Exemption
Section 690.31 (b) provides for a number of situations where the dwelling
house exemption does not apply. It states:
(b) The exemption provided in subdivision (a) does not apply:
(1) Whenever the debtor or the spouse of the debtor has an
existing declared homestead on any property in this state
other than property which is the subject of a proceeding
under subdivision (c) of this section. The existence of a
homestead declared by the debtor or the debtor's spouse
under Section 1300 of the Civil Code shall not affect the right
of the other spouse to an exemption under this section.
(2) Whenever a judgment or abstract thereof or any other obliga-
tion which by statute is given the force and effect of a
judgment lien has been recorded prior to either:
(i) The acquisition of the property by the debtor or the spouse of
the debtor; or
(ii) The commencement of residence by the debtor or the spouse
of the debtor, whichever last occurs.
(3) Whenever the execution or forced sale is in satisfaction of
judgments obtained:
(i) On debts secured by mechanics, contractors, subcontractors,
artisans, architects, builders, laborers of every class, or ma-
terialmen's or vendors' liens upon the premises;
(ii) On debts secured by encumbrances on the premises executed
and acknowledged by husband and wife, by a claimant of a
married person's separate homestead, or by an unmarried
claimant; or
(iii) On debts secured by encumbrances on the premises, ex-
ecuted and recorded prior to or in connection with the acquis-
ition of the property by the debtor or the spouse of the
debtor. 115
This section has been largely taken over from former Section 690.235 with
seemingly little attention paid to its ramifications. The first paragraph,
Section 690.31 (b)(1), is confusing. It evidently limits a debtor's entitlement
to a claimed dwelling house exemption to situations where neither the debtor
nor the debtor's spouse has an existing declared homestead in California,
except if the declared homestead is the subject of a proceeding by a creditor
to enforce a judgment against the homestead. In that case, it seems that this
section would enable a debtor to claim a dwelling house exemption on one
113. See CAL. CIV. CODE §1265.
114. See CAL. CIV. CODE §1242.
115. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §690.31(b).
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residence and a homestead exemption on another if a creditor were proceed-
ing to execute on the homestead. This strange interpretation appears to be
required by the plain language of Section 690.31(b)(1). The section also
permits a debtor to claim a dwelling house exemption if the debtor's spouse
has declared a married person's separate homestead, pursuant to Civil Code
Section 1300.
The second paragraph, Section 690.31(b)(2), is also poorly drafted. It
should be interpreted to state that the exemption does not apply to the
enforcement of those judgments against the debtor whose abstracts were
recorded in the county where the dwelling house is located prior to the time
either the debtor or the debtor's spouse acquired the property or began living
there. Even so construed, this provision denies the protection of the dwell-
ing house exemption to a debtor who changes residences. With this provi-
sion, the dwelling house exemption is only temporary and its protection is
lost when the debtor sells the dwelling house. In contrast, under the declared
homestead law a debtor can carry the homestead exemption from one
homestead to another. 116
The third paragraph, Section 690.31(b)(3), makes the dwelling house
exemption inapplicable to the enforcement of debts secured by mechanics'
or similar types of liens, and consensual liens. Even though the dwelling
house may be subject to the liens specified in Section 690.31(b)(3), a
creditor may lose his lien on the dwelling house if the creditor violates the
one action rule. 117 Where a debt is secured by a mortgage, the creditor must
foreclose on the mortgage in order to obtain the lien priority of Section
690.31(b)(3); if the creditor obtains a personal money judgment against the
debtor instead of foreclosing, the debtor may protect the dwelling house by
claiming the exemption in Section 690.31.118
D. Procedure for Claiming the Dwelling House Exemption
One of the major changes made by the substitution of Section 690.31 for
Section 690.235 is in the procedure for claiming the dwelling house exemp-
tion. 119 Under Section 690.31(c) a creditor who wishes to enforce a judg-
ment against a dwelling house must file a verified application for the
issuance of a writ of execution with a court in the county where the property
116. CAL. CIv. CODE §1265a.
117. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE; §726; see J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED
TRANSACTIONS §§6.3-.12 (1970); J. HETLAND, SECURED REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS §§9.4-.18
(1974).
118. See James v. P.C.S. Ginning Co., 276 Cal. App. 2d 19, 22, 80 Cal. Rptr. 457, 459
(1969).
119. The exemption under Section 690.235 of the Code of Civil Procedure, repealed CAL.
STATS. 1976, c. 1000, §3, at 2369, was claimed by the procedure set forth in Section 690.50 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, which procedure is applicable to the claiming of many of the
exemptions set forth in Section 690 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
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is located. 120 The application must state either that the dwelling house is not
exempt or that the value of the dwelling house, over and above all liens and
encumbrances thereon, 121 exceeds the amount of the dwelling house exemp-
tion. If the creditor alleges in the application that the dwelling house is not
exempt, the creditor must state in the application the reasons why it is not
exempt and that no declared homestead has been recorded with respect to
the dwelling house. In addition, if the creditor alleges that the dwelling
house is not exempt, the creditor must state in the application that no current
homeowner's exemption 22 has been claimed by the debtor or the debtor's
spouse with respect to the dwelling house, or, if one has been claimed, the
reasons why the debtor is not entitled to the dwelling house exemption.
The literal wording of Section 690.31(c) appears to require a judgment
creditor to follow its procedure if the creditor wishes to enforce a judgment
against any dwelling house, including a declared homestead. In the recent
case of Krause v. Superior Court,123 however, the court held that Section
690.31 applied only to dwelling houses other than declared homesteads, and
that a judgment creditor must follow the procedures set forth in Civil Code
Sections 1245 to 1259 in order to execute on a declared homestead rather
than the procedure found in Section 690.31.124
If the judgment was rendered in a county other than where the dwelling
house is located, the judgment creditor must file an abstract of judgment
with the court and pay the fees specified in Section 690.31(c). 1 25 Once a
completed application has been filed with the court, the court must set a time
and place for a hearing on the application and issue an order for the debtor to
show cause why a writ of execution should not be issued. 126 The levying
officer is required to mail copies of the creditor's application, the order to
show cause, and the notice specified in Section 690.31(d) to the debtor and
to any other person in whose name the property stands on the records of the
office of the county tax assessor. 127 The levying officer is also required to
personally serve the occupant of the dwelling house with copies of the
creditor's application, the order to show cause, and the notice, or post these
documents in a conspicuous place, or leave them with an agent, or employee
of the occupant or a member of the occupant's household. 128 The notice
120. This contrasts with the general practice of having the court where the judgment was
entered issue the writ of execution.
121. The phrase "all liens and encumbrances" probably should not be interpreted to
include the creditor's own judgment lien, see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §674(c), or liens that are
subsequent to the creditor's lien; otherwise, the creditor would be prevented from using an
execution sale to recover on only a portion of his judgment.
122. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §218.
123. 78 Cal. App. 3d 499, 144 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1978).
124. Id. at 505, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 197.
125. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §690.31(c)(2).
126. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §690.31(d).
127. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §690.31(1).
128. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §690.31(1).
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required by Section 690.31(d) must be provided in both English and Spanish
and is set forth below:
IMPORTANT LEGAL NOTICE TO HOMEOWNER AND
RESIDENT
1. Your house is in danger of being sold to satisfy a judgment
obtained in court. You may be able to protect the house and real
property described in the accompanying application from execu-
tion and forced sale if you or your family now actually reside on
the property and presently do not have a declared homestead
legally recorded with the county recorder on any other property in
the State of California. YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE MUST COME
TO THE HEARING TO SHOW THESE FACTS.
2. If you or your spouse want to contest the forced sale of this
property, you or your spouse must appear at
(location set forth in OSC)
on and be prepared to answer questions concerning(date and time)
the statements made in the attached application. THE ONLY
PURPOSE OF THE HEARING WILL BE TO DETERMINE
WHETHER THE PROPERTY CAN BE SOLD, NOT
WHETHER YOU OWE THE MONEY.
3. FOR YOUR OWN PROTECTION, YOU SHOULD
PROMPTLY SEEK THE ADVICE OF AN ATTORNEY IN
THIS MATTER. IF YOU ARE A TENANT AND DO NOT
CLAIM TO BE THE OWNER OR BUYER OF THIS PROPER-
TY, THIS NOTICE DOES NOT AFFECT YOU. PLEASE GIVE
IT TO YOUR LANDLORD. 1
The notice to the debtor does much to cure one of the major failings of the
declared homestead law: that many debtors were unaware of the homestead
law and were consequently not protected by it because they failed to record a
declaration of homestead before an abstract of judgment against them was
recorded. Under Section 690.31 a debtor must receive notice and a hearing
before a writ of execution can be issued against the dwelling house. In
contrast, under former Section 690.235 the debtor did not receive notice of
the right to claim the exemption until the debtor was served with the writ of
execution.
Under Section 690.31 the court is required to determine at a hearing on
the creditor's application whether the dwelling house is exempt, and if so,
whether its value over and above all liens and encumberances thereon, 129
exceeds the amount of the dwelling house exemption. Section 690.31(e)
allocates the burden of proof at the hearing to the debtor on the issue of
129. See note 121 supra.
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whether the dwelling house is exempt, and to the creditor on the issue of
whether the value of the dwelling house, over and above all liens and
encumbrances, exceeds the exempt amount. 130 The debtor should be able to
prove entitlement to this exemption by showing that the debtor or the
debtor's family actually resides in the dwelling house. On the other hand, if
the creditor contends that the exemption is not applicable because of one of
the exceptions to the exemption found in Section 690.31(b), 131 the creditor
should have the burden of proving that one of these exceptions is available
to defeat the debtor's claim of exemption. Section 690.31(h) gives the
debtor a second chance under certain circumstances to claim the dwelling
house exemption, if the debtor failed to attend the hearing on the creditor's
application the first time. If a writ of execution is issued after a hearing at
which neither the debtor, the debtor's spouse nor the debtor's attorney
appeared, then the debtor must be served with a notice, in the form specified
in Section 690.31(g), that the debtor has a second chance to claim the
dwelling house exemption. 132 The debtor or the debtor's spouse may then
submit a declaration stating that the dwelling house may be exempt and that
their absence or the absence of their attorney from the hearing was due to
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. 33 If such a declaration
is filed, the levying officer must postpone the sale of the dwelling house and
the clerk of the court must set another hearing to determine if the writ of
execution should be recalled. 13
E. Execution on the Dwelling House and Allocation of the Proceeds
After the hearing the court must make an order 135 directing the issuance of
a writ of execution if the court determines that the dwelling house is not
exempt or, if it is exempt, that the creditor is entitled to levy against the
excess over the exemption. 136 If the creditor's application is denied, subse-
quent applications within 12 months of the denial must be supported by a
statement under oath that there is a material change of circumstances
affecting the exemption. 137
130. Evidentally, the value of the dwelling house is determined from evidence submitted by
the creditor and the debtor at the hearing on the creditor's application. In contrast, under the
declared homestead law, the value of the homestead is determined from the report of three
disinterested appraisers appointed by the court. CAL. CIV. CODE §§1249-1254.
131. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
132. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §690.31(h).
133. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §690.31(h).
134. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §690.31(h).
135. The order must specify whether the dwelling house is exempt, and if so, the amount of
the exemption, and a copy of the order must be transmitted to the court where the judgment
was rendered. The writ of execution must specify the amounts to be distributed and provide the
names and addresses of the exempt debtor and persons having encumbrances against the
dwelling house. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE §690.31(f).
136. The second sentence of California Civil Procedure Code Section 690.31(f) is incorrect-
ly worded. It states: "The order shall state whether or not the dwelling house is exempt and, if
not exempt, state that the judgment creditor is entitled only to execution against the excess over
the exempt amount." The phrase "if not exempt" should be changed to "if exempt."
137. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §690.31(i).
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Section 690.31(j) provides for the allocation of the proceeds of an execu-
tion sale of a dwelling house in the same manner as Civil Code Section
1256.138 Like Civil Code Section 1256, Code of Civil Procedure Section
690.31(j) should be interpreted so that the judgment creditor holding the
execution sale receives priority over subsequent lienholders, and the claim-
ant of the dwelling house exemption receives priority over the judgment
creditor. It would be helpful if the statutory language were changed to
reflect this interpretation.
Section 690.31(k) exempts from execution for six months that portion of
the proceeds received by the claimant after an execution sale that represents
the amount of the dwelling house exemption. It also exempts from execution
a dwelling house acquired by the debtor with the exempt proceeds within six
months after their receipt. The exemption of the subsequently acquired
dwelling house, however, is not applicable to judgment liens obtained
before the acquisition of the dwelling house; 139 thus, a debtor receives no
more protection by purchasing another dwelling house from the exempt
proceeds of an execution sale of the previous dwelling house than would be
obtained if the debtor had purchased the new dwelling house from other
funds. As previously noted, 140 the protection afforded by the dwelling house
exemption is very limited after the dwelling house has been sold.
F Attachment of the Dwelling House
Another aspect of the protection afforded by exemption laws is the
protection they afford from attachment. Section 690.31 provides only for an
exemption from execution and it does not specifically exempt a dwelling
house from attachment; but Code of Civil Procedure Section 487.020
provides that all property exempt from execution is exempt from attach-
ment. I
While a dwelling house is exempt from attachment to the same extent that
it is exempt from execution, 41 the procedure for claiming an exemption
from attachment differs from the procedure set forth in Section 690.31.
Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 484.070 the debtor must claim an
exemption from attachment at the attachment hearing with respect to proper-
ty listed in the creditor's application for a writ of attachment. Section
484.070 requires that the debtor receive a copy of the creditor's application
at least 20 days prior to the hearing. In order to obtain an ex parte writ of
attachment the creditor must file an application supported by an affidavit
showing that the property sought to be attached is not exempt from attach-
ment; following the issuance of an exparte writ of attachment, a debtor may
138. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
139. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §690.31(k).
140. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
141. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §487.020.
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claim an exemption by following the procedure set forth in Section 690.50
within 30 days after receiving the notice of attachment.
Although the procedure for claiming an exemption from attachment offers
some protection to the debtor, the debtor does not receive the explicit notice
set forth in Section 690.31(d) of the right to claim the dwelling house
exemption. Since a debtor should receive at least as much protection from
attachment as from execution, it is recommended that the law be changed so
that this notice is given prior to attachment as well as prior to execution.
G. The Dwelling House Exemption in Bankruptcy
As noted earlier, 42 a bankrupt may claim those exemptions that are
allowed by state law. A debtor in California is entitled to a dwelling house
exemption for the dwelling house in which the debtor or the debtor's family
actually resides, provided that the debtor does not have an existing declared
homestead. Therefore, such a debtor would be entitled to claim the dwelling
house exemption in a bankruptcy proceeding by stating the claim in the
schedule of property filed pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 108.143 Because of
the similarity of the dwelling house exemption to the homestead exemption,
statutory and case law pertaining to the homestead exemption in bankruptcy,
other than that dealing with the recording of a declaration of homestead,
should be applicable to the dwelling house exemption in bankruptcy. 144
H. Retroactivity
The dwelling house exemption law provides that the law will not affect
the rights of any lienholder or encumbrancer that have vested prior to July 1,
1977.145 Thus the dwelling house exemption is not applicable to judgment
liens obtained against a dwelling house prior to July 1, 1977, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the debtor may have acquired the dwelling house and may
have begun living there before the creditor's abstract of judgment was
recorded.
A recent case may have narrowed the application of the dwelling house
exemption even further. In Daylin Medical and Surgical Supply, Inc. v.
Thomas,146 the court held that the application of the exemption of Section
690.235 to debts incurred before its effective date (July 1, 1975) violated
142. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
143. 11 U.S.C. §I 10(c)(3) (1976) gives the trustee of the bankrupt's estate the status of a
creditor who has obtained a judgment lien on the debtor's property at the date of bankruptcy.
Although a judgment lien will attach to a dwelling house under California Civil Procedure Code
Section 674(c), the dwelling house is exempt from execution on account of the judgment lien to
the extent of the exemption. Since the dwelling house is exempt from execution to the extent of
the exemption, a debtor should be entitled to claim the dwelling house exemption in bank-
ruptcy.
144. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra.
145. CAL. STATS. 1976, c. 1000, §5, at 2373.
146. 69 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 37, 138 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1977).
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article I, section 10 of the United States Constitution by impairing the
obligation of contracts. 147 The court reasoned that Section 690.235 created a
new exemption which had not existed before it was enacted and that it would
be unconstitutional to apply this new exemption to defeat an obligation that
arose prior to the enactment of Section 690.235.148 The court relied on cases
holding that an increase in the amount of the homestead exemption could not
be applied to debts arising before the increase took effect. 149 However, the
court missed the point that all homeowners in California had been entitled to
homestead protection prior to the enactment of Section 690.235 and that
Section 690.235 merely substituted a different procedure for claiming this
protection, as in turn did Section 690.31. The fundamental purpose of
Sections 690.235 and 690.31 was to provide debtors with notice of their
right to claim homestead protection, not to create a new exemption. With
the enactment of Sections 690.235 and 690.31 the legislature, in effect,
caused declarations of homestead to be filed on behalf of all homeowners in
California, and in doing so, no more impaired the obligation of contracts
than if the homeowners had recorded declarations of homesteads them-
selves.
PROPOSALS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
The preceding discussion has pointed out a number of inconsistencies that
exist between the three systems that California presently provides for the
protection of the family home. Each system has its own peculiar advantages
and disadvantages with respect to the others and much of the complexity in
this area of the law results from the interplay of these separate systems. It
would be beneficial if the legislature would reduce this complexity by
adopting a more uniform statutory scheme for the protection of the family
home. This section of the article will serve to highlight the differences
between the three systems of homestead legislation and offer recommenda-
tions for eliminating these differences so that the humane purpose of the
homestead laws can be furthered.
A. Reform of the Declared Homestead and Dwelling House Exemption
The two most significant differences between the dwelling house exemp-
tion and the declared homestead are in the procedure for claiming the
exemption and in the ability of the debtor to carry the exemption from one
home to the next. The declared homestead law requires the debtor to record
147. Id. at 39, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 880.
148. Id. at 39, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 880. See also Karol, Effective Insolvency Planning for the
Consumer Bankrupt in California, 52 L.A.B.J. 376 (1977).
149. See In re Rauer's Collection Co., 87 Cal. App. 2d 248,253-54, 196 P.2d 803,807 (1948);
In re Towers, 146 F. Supp. 882, 885-86 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1956), affd sub nom., Towers v. Curry,
247 F.2d 738, 740 (9th Cir. 1957).
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a declaration of homestead before a creditor records an abstract of judgment
in order to protect the debtor's home from the creditor. 150 Under Section
690.31 the debtor is allowed to claim the dwelling house exemption at a
hearing prior to the issuance of a writ of execution after receiving notice of
the debtor's right to the exemption.
The purpose of the recording requirement of the declared homestead law
is to enable title searchers to determine title to residential property. A title
searcher can easily determine from the county records whether a recorded
abstract of judgment affects title to a declared homestead by noting whether
or not the abstract of judgment was recorded prior to the declaration of
homestead. Without a system for recordation of homesteads the title sear-
cher would have to go outside the county records to determine whether a
debtor was entitled to homestead protection; the task of determining title
would be nearly impossible if the debtor owned more than one residence or
if the recorded abstract of judgment was far back in the chain of title.
The need for recordation of a homestead does not arise under the dwelling
house exemption procedure, because Code of Civil Procedure Section
674(c) provides that a judgment lien will attach to a dwelling house, except
if it is a declared homestead. Section 690.31 only protects a dwelling house
from execution temporarily; if the dwelling house is sold, either voluntarily
or involuntarily at an execution sale, the creditor can enforce the judgment
lien against the new owner. In contrast, under the declared homestead law,
no judgment lien will attach to a declared homestead. If the homestead is
sold, the creditor cannot enforce the judgment against the new owner.
Moreover, the proceeds of the sale are protected for six months 151 and the
debtor can protect a new home that is purchased within six months with the
proceeds of the sale from the creditor by recording a second declaration of
homestead. 152
The fact that a debtor's protection under Section 690.31 is effectively lost
when the dwelling house is sold, outweighs the benefit of any notice the
debtor may receive of the right to claim the exemption. Fortunately, it is
possible to combine the advantage in Section 690.31 that the debtor receives
notice of the exemption in time to claim it with the advantage of the declared
homestead law that the debtor can change homesteads without losing the
protection of the homestead exemption. It is proposed that this be accom-
plished by repealing Section 690.31 and modifying the declared homestead
law to provide for notice to the debtor of the right to the homestead
exemption.
The easiest way to modify the declared homestead law so that the debtor
would have notice of the exemption would be to permit the debtor to record
150. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1241(1).
151. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§1257, 1265.
152. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §1265a.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 9
a declaration of homestead for a period after levy of execution on the
dwelling. 153 A notice in the form prescribed by Section 690.31(d) would be
required to accompany the writ of execution. The recordation of a declara-
tion of homestead prior to the execution sale would operate to dissolve any
judgment liens on the dwelling to the extent of the homestead exemption.
Judgment liens would continue after the declaration of homestead on the
excess over the amount of the homestead exemption, however, so that the
judgment creditor would retain priority with respect to subsequent lienhol-
ders.
Allowing a debtor to record a declaration of homestead after levy of ex-
ecution on the debtor's home would also benefit debtors in bankruptcy.
Under present law a California debtor must record a declaration of home-
stead prior to the date of bankruptcy in order to claim the homestead
exemption in bankruptcy; but, if the debtor could protect the home from
judgment creditors by recording a declaration of homestead after an abstract
of judgment against the debtor had been recorded, it would not be necessary
for the debtor to record a declaration of homestead before the date of
bankruptcy in order to claim the homestead exemption in bankruptcy.15 4
Therefore, changing the homestead law so that a debtor could record a
declaration of homestead after levy of execution would extend the protection
of the homestead exemption to those bankrupt debtors who fail to record a
declaration of homestead before the date of bankruptcy because they are
unaware of the homestead law.
These changes can be implemented by removing Civil Code Section
1241(1) and modifying Civil Code Section 1240 to provide that the home-
stead is exempt from execution or forced sale only to the extent of the
exemption provided in Civil Code Section 1260. Code of Civil Procedure
Section 674 should be changed by deleting subsection (c) and changing
subsection (a) so that a judgment lien attaches to real property of the
debtor to the extent that it is not exempt from execution. Also, a provision
should be added to the Code of Civil Procedure that would require a writ of
execution or attachment against a dwelling house, other than a declared
homestead, to be accompanied by a notice to the debtor of the right to a
homestead exemption in a form similar to that now required by Code of
Civil Procedure Section 690.31. Finally, there should be an explicit provi-
sion in the Civil Code stating that a debtor is entitled to protect the dwelling
from execution or attachment by recording a declaration of homestead and
notifying the levying officer during a period after the levy but before the sale
of the property.155
153. See text accompanying notes 151-164 supra, for other proposals to extend the protec-
tion of the declared homestead law.
154. Schultz v. Mantrangelo, 333 F.2d 278 (9th Cir. 1964).
155. See note 23 supra.
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The provisions in Civil Code Sections 1245 through 1259 should be
retained with some modifications and should continue to govern the proce-
dure for execution or attachment on a declared homestead. One area of
concern is that the debtor should not be allowed to block an execution sale
by voluntarily encumbering the homestead so that the excess over the
homestead exemption is wiped out. Therefore, the provisions in section
1245 to 1259 permitting an execution sale if the value of the homestead
exceeds the amount of the homestead exemption plus the amount of all liens
and encumbrances thereon, should be altered so that only liens and encum-
brances prior to the judgment creditor's lien on the excess are considered.
Also, the rule in the Schoenfeld v. Norberg56 case should be changed by
legislation so that if a homestead is held by the debtor and the debtor's
spouse in joint tenancy, the court could order an execution sale of both of
their interests in the homestead, subject to the spouse's right of first refusal
to purchase the property at its sale price. Such a provision could be patterned
after Section 363 of the proposed Bankruptcy Law157 and would serve to
facilitate the execution sale of joint tenancy property.
Civil Code Section 1256 should be amended so that it states more
accurately the order of priority of lienholders with respect to the proceeds of
an execution sale. The order of priority of the liens on the homestead should
be as otherwise provided by law and the proceeds of an execution sale
should be distributed accordingly, with the exception that the debtor should
receive the amount of the homestead exemption out of the sale proceeds
ahead of any judgment creditor. Problems may arise if there are creditors
with consensual or mechanics or similar types of liens that are subsequent to
the lien of the judgment creditor who caused the execution sale. In such
cases the judgment creditor should retain priority with respect to these
subsequent creditors, but if the subsequent creditors hold consensual, me-
chanics or similar types of liens, they should be allowed to enforce such
liens out of the sale proceeds, including the amount of the homestead
exemption, received by the debtor.
Although a declaration of homestead would dissolve judgment liens to the
extent of the homestead exemption, the excess over the homestead exemp-
tion would still be subject to judgment liens. Judgment liens on the excess
might create a cloud on the debtor's title even if there were no excess to
which the judgment liens could attach because the value of the homestead
was less than the total of the homestead exemption and the encumbrances
prior to the judgment liens. A procedure should be adopted to enable a
156. See text accompanying notes 35-40 supra.
157. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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debtor to discharge judgment liens in their entirety Where no excess over the
homestead exemption exists, so that clouds on the debtor's title due to
judgment liens on a nonexistent excess could be removed, and the debtor
could sell the homestead if he chose. Such a procedure could be modelled
after that found in Oregon Revised Statutes Section 23.280 (1975).158 The
Oregon procedure permits a debtor or a prospective purchaser of the home-
stead to file a notice of intent to discharge the lien with the judgment
lienholder and the court where the judgment was rendered. The lien will be
discharged 14 days after the filing of the notice unless the creditor objects to
the notice and requests a hearing. At the hearing the court determines if the
homestead is exempt, and if so, whether its fair market value exceeds the
exemption. If the fair market value is less than the exemption, the court will
order that the homestead is not subject to the lien; otherwise, the lien will
remain unaffected by the notice.
The provisions in Sections 1257 and 1265 protecting the proceeds from
the sale of a homestead up to the amount of the homestead exemption should
be retained, as should the provision in Section 1265a that permits a debtor to
protect a homestead purchased from the proceeds of a sale of a previous
homestead. The requirement in Section 1265a, however, that the declaration
of homestead be recorded within six months of the sale of the previous
homestead is unnecessary and should be removed.
A number of the provisions of the declared homestead law could also be
simplified and reordered. The definitions in Civil Code Section 1237.5 are
unnecessary and should be removed. Also, the first three sentences in
Section 1238 could be simplified by substituting for them a statement that
the homestead may be selected from any property of the debtor or his
spouse. In addition, the provisions relating to the procedure for declaration
of a homestead could be placed together or consolidated. Finally, a proce-
dure should be adopted by which the amount of the homestead exemption
could be revised to reflect changes in the cost of living without the need for
the legislature to act to amend Civil Code Section 1260.159
The foregoing proposed changes would extend the protection of the
declared homestead law to larger numbers of debtors in California. At the
same time these changes would bolster the ability of creditors to reach the
excess value of a homestead over the exempt amount in order to enforce a
debtor's obligations. In addition, the burdens imposed by Section 690.31 on
debtors, creditors and the courts would be reduced as a debtor would be able
158. See also Wis. STAT. ANN. §815.20(2) (West 1977).
159. See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. §104 (1977) for the procedure in the proposed
Bankruptcy Law for adjusting dollar amounts in the proposed law.
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to claim an exemption by recording a declaration of homestead instead of
having to attend a hearing, and a creditor would not have to provide notice
and a hearing to the debtor, except where such notice and hearing were
necessary to protect the debtor's interests. These changes would, however,
only improve the homestead law as it relates to debtors' and creditors'
rights; additional changes are necessary to reform the homestead law as it
relates to the disposition of the family home on the death of its owner.
B. Reform of the Declared Homestead and Probate Homestead Laws
The manner of disposition of the family home on the death of its owner is
affected by whether the owner or the owner's spouse elected to obtain
protection from their creditors by recording a declaration of homestead
during the owner's lifetime. The major differences between the declared
homestead and probate homestead laws can be summarized as follows: first,
if a homestead was declared during the decedent's lifetime, title will vest in
the surviving spouse; whereas, if no homestead was declared, a probate
homestead will be selected which will pass to the surviving spouse and
minor children of the decedent; second, the value of a declared homestead
that can pass to the surviving spouse is limited to an arbitrary amount and
the declared homestead must be divided or sold if its value exceeds that
amount, while no limitation is placed on the value of a probate homestead
that may be assigned; third, liens and encumbrances on a declared home-
stead are exonerated from the funds of the estate, while a probate homestead
passes to the surviving spouse and minor children subject to existing liens
and encumbrances; finally, the probate homestead can be set aside to the
surviving spouse and minor children for only a limited period if the probate
homestead is selected from separate property of the decedent, but they
can receive an estate in fee simple if the probate homestead is selected from
other than separate property of the decedent.
It is submitted that no justification exists for the disparity in the treatment
of declared homesteads and probate homesteads and it is urged that the law
be changed so that the disposition of the family home on the death of its
owner would be handled in the same manner whether or not a declaration of
homestead had been recorded during his lifetime. The fundamental purpose
of the declaration of homestead is to protect the family home from creditors;
the existence of a declaration of homestead ought not affect its disposition
upon the death of its owner.
In order to make the declared homestead and probate homestead laws
more uniform, it is recommended that the law be changed so that the probate
court is required to designate a probate homestead from the estate for the
benefit of the surviving spouse and minor children whether or not a declara-
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tion of homestead had previously been filed.160 Provision should be made,
however, to limit the discretion of the probate court in its selection of the
probate homestead if both spouses have joined in a declaration of homestead
during the decedent's lifetime; in such a circumstance, the probate court
should be required to designate the declared homestead as the probate
homestead. 161 Also, the surviving spouse and minor children should be
given the same interest, including an estate in fee simple, that the decedent
had in the family home even if the probate homestead is designated from the
decedent's separate property. 162 The present limitation of the interest in a
decedent's separate property that can be set aside to a surviving spouse to a
life estate restricts the spouse's ability to sell the homestead and move to
another one.
No limit should be placed on the value of the probate homestead to be
designated by the probate court and the court should have discretion to
designate a probate homestead that would provide the most suitable home
for the surviving spouse and minor children. The law should specify,
however, that a probate homestead is protected only to the extent of a
declared homestead, and creditors of the estate and of the surviving spouse
and children should be able to execute on the excess over the homestead
exemption to enforce the obligations owed to them. Also, debts of the kind
specified in subsections (2), (3) and (4) of Civil Code Section 1241 should
be enforceable against the probate homestead to the same extent as they
would be enforceable against a declared homestead.
Finally, the provision in Probate Code Section 735 that liens and encum-
brances on a declared homestead should be paid out of the funds of the estate
should be abolished. In today's economy it is unusual for real property to be
owned free and clear of all liens and encumbrances. Real property is
generally financed by means of mortgages and deeds of trust, so that the
interest of the owner in the property is only a small portion of its value. 163
The exoneration rule in Probate Code Section 735 is out of step with today's
economy and opposed to the modern trend which disfavors exoneration. 164
These changes would simplify the procedure for the disposition of the
family home and help insure that the decedent's surviving spouse and minor
children are protected from losing the family home as a result of his death.
160. This recommendation was made in Recommendation Relating to Summary Distribu-
tion of Small Estates Under Probate Code Sections 640 to 646, 1 CAL. LAW REvisION COMM'N
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 50, 52 (1955).
161. Such a provision would enable the spouses to determine the disposition of the family
home in the event one of them should die, without fear that their plans will be upset by the
probate court.
162. This was also proposed in Recommendations Relating to Summary Distribution of
Small Estates Under Probate Code Sections 640 to 646, 1 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N
REPORTS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 50, 52 (1955).
163. See Estate of Brown, 240 Cal. App. 2d 818, 820, 50 Cal. Rptr. 78, 80 (1966).
164. Id.
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CONCLUSION
California's homestead legislation provides a great deal of protection for
debtors and their families. Both the current declared homestead and claimed
dwelling house exemption laws protect debtor's homes to a large extent
from forced sale by unsecured creditors. The declared homestead and
probate homestead laws protect a decedent's family from loss of the family
home. Unfortunately, there exist a number of technical legal problems with
each of the three systems of homestead legislation and each system is in
some respects inconsistent with the others. Accordingly, it is proposed that
the legislature act to simplify and strengthen California's homestead legisla-
tion.
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